World markets are highly interlinked and local economies extensively rely on global supply and value chains. Consequently, local production disruptions, for instance caused by extreme weather events, are likely to induce indirect losses along supply chains with potentially global repercussions. These complex loss dynamics represent a challenge for comprehensive disaster risk assessments. Here, we introduce the numerical agentbased model acclimate designed to analyze the cascading of economic losses in the global supply network. Using national sectors as agents, we apply the model to study the global propagation of losses induced by stylized disasters. We find that indirect losses can become comparable in size to direct ones; they are enhanced by price effects, but can be efficiently mitigated by warehousing and idle capacities. Since also the network structure determines indirect losses, a comprehensive risk assessment cannot focus solely on first-tier suppliers but has to take the whole supply chain into account. We further find that local disasters can have global welfare implications emphasizing the high public relevance of supply chain security. To render the supply network climate-proof, national adaptation policies have to be complemented by international adaptation efforts. In that regard, our model can be employed to assess reasonable leverage points and to identify dynamic bottlenecks inaccessible to static analyses.
Introduction
We here present the dynamic agent-based model acclimate describing the propagation of disaster-induced production losses in the global economic network. We define disasters as unanticipated local events leading to a sudden involuntary production reduction of the affected economic sectors. These can be natural disasters such as earth quakes and volcano eruptions and extreme weather events such as heatwaves, floods, and tropical cyclones. For the economic system, the latter are likely to become even more challenging in the future as they are projected to increase in intensity and frequency under ongoing climate change (Herring et al., 2014; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014) . In the present-day global economy, local firms and markets are highly interlinked forming a complex network of supply and value chains. Consequently, local disasters can have global repercussions: direct, disaster-induced losses can spread to other sectors via to avoid an overfilling of its input storages. This propagation of damage in the opposite direction of the economic flow is also known as backward-ripple effect of the economy (Hallegatte, 2008 (Hallegatte, , 2014b . Both supply and demand anomalies constitute cascading deviations from the baseline state of the network. We aim to study the indirect production and consumption losses they induce. market clearing equilibrium: the topology of the economic network and the ability of the remaining suppliers to mitigate scarcity situations by production extension. For simplicity reasons, the network topology is static in this version of the model, i. e., the agents cannot set-up new business connections in the disaster aftermath to replace suppliers with delivery problems or those that are not competitive anymore. This restriction will be dropped in subsequent model versions. 130 A demand request a purchaser js addresses to a supplier ir is a tuple D (t−1) ir←js , n (t−1) ir←js of demanded quantity and corresponding dimensionless purchasing price
which is obtained by normalizing the offered price P (t−1)
ir←js with respect to the baseline price P * = 1. The monetary value of such a tuple is given by the product of the demanded quantity and its dimensionless price 3 , v(D
Supplier ir responds to js's demand requests by sending a flow Z (t) ir→js at price n (t−1) ir←js in the next timestep (t) (see Fig. 1 ). It cannot negotiate the price but only decides to which extent it is willing to fulfill the demand request at that price. Since we postulate a demand-driven economy, supply flows must not exceed demand flows. In the baseline state, we assume the economy to be in a market clearing equilibrium and supply flows equal demand flows,
These initial flows are derived from multi-regional Input-Output (MRIO) tables. The level of regional and sectoral detail in the representation of the global economy is limited by data availability only.
Besides flows, the model accounts for two types of material stocks acting as buffers under supply shocks: inventories for the input goods the agents need for production or consumption (blue boxes in Fig. 1) , and transport stocks consisting of the commodities 'en route' (see 'transport chain' in Fig. 1 ). More details on 135 the management of these stocks can be found in Appendix A.1.
In each timestep, production and consumption sites aim to maximize their profit and their consumption, respectively. For that, production sites undergo subsequently three decision points, whereas for consumption sites only the first and the last ones are relevant. These decision points sub-divide the timestep into three subsequent sub-steps: a production/consumption step, an expectation step, and a purchasing step; these are 140 discussed in Sects. 2.1-2.3. In each sub-step the agents exchange information with their business partners, which they need for making decisions in the following sub-step. Figure 2 depicts the mutual dependence of variables within one timestep for a production site; the three sub-steps are marked by different shadings. In the following, to allege notation, time indices (t) belonging to quantities of the current timestep (t) are suppressed as well as the time index (t − 1) belonging to demand requests of the previous timestep. 145 
Production/consumption step
In this first sub-step (blue shading in Fig. 2) , production sites determine their optimal production level for the current timestep as described in Sec. 2.1.1, whereas consumption sites determine their consumption level as detailed in Sec. 2.1.2. Further details on the production step are provided in Appendix A.2.
Production step 150
Each production site determines its profit-maximizing production level based on (i) the demand requests it has received from its purchasers in the previous timestep, (ii) its productive capacity, and (iii) the availability of input goods needed for production (see Fig. 3 for an illustration). As in I-O models, we assume that the production system is based on a Leontief production function: all inputs are perfect complements and therefore no substitution is possible among them. In the case of supply limitation, the input good i with the lowest quantity available for production,Û i→js (see Eq. (A.12) for its definition), determines production. Reducing this quantity by a certain factor then reduces the productive capacityX js by the same factor, thus assuming constant returns to scale. To render the production system more flexible than in I-O models, we assume that each production site js has the possibility to extend its production above the initial level X * js = ku Z * js→ku by a factor β j ≥ 1, which may vary among sectors. Further, js's production level can be reduced by an exogenous factor λ js ∈ [0, 1] representing the disaster's forcing; in the baseline state no forcing is present, i. e., λ * js = 1. In consequence, productive capacityX js is constrained by js's maximum production ratio λ js β j and by the minimum relative availability of its input goods i. The latter is the lowest ratio of possible quantity to be used,Û i→js , to initial quantity used, U * i→js (defined in Eq. (A.4) ). In consequence, the productive capacity is given aŝ
Profit is defined as the difference of revenue and costs, Π js (X js ) ≡ R js (X js ) − C js (X js ). The cost curve C js (X js ) gives the costs associated with a production levelX js . It increases linearly with productionX js below production extension (X js ≤ λ js X * js ). In production extension, costs increase, e. g., 155 because of long-hours of workers, resulting in a super-linear increase of the costs (see blue solid lines in the lower panel of Fig. 3 ; see Appendix A.2.2 for details). The revenue curve R js (X js ) describes the functional relationship between the cumulative values of the demand requests js has received from its purchasers (cf. upper panel in Fig. 3 ) and its production level of X js , i. e., it yields the revenue js would gain by fulfilling the demand requests up to a production level of X js . Thus, if the total incoming demand
is satisfied, js cannot increase its revenue further by extending production; the revenue curve is constant foȓ X js > D js← (cf. solid orange lines in the lower panel of Fig. 3 ; see Appendix A.2.1 for details). Production site js determines its actual production X js by maximizing its profit 4 under the constraint that production may not exceed productive capacityX js (Eq. 3), X js ≡ argmax Xjs Π js (X js ) subject to 0 ≤X js ≤X js .
It is worthy to note, that in equilibrium optimal production X js equals the total incoming demand D js← (cf. Fig. 3 (a)), whereas in disequilibrium situations js might not fulfill all demand requests. Such a situation is depicted in Fig. 3(b) , in which the last demand request denoted by a black box is not served. After production, each production site distributes its output among those purchasers that offered a sufficiently high price, starting with the highest-bidding purchaser. In consequence, js sells its production X js to an average price ofn
Note that this price does not necessarily equal the average price the purchasers offered,
In general, both prices are equal only in equilibrium and differ otherwise. 4 An analytical expression for the optimal production level X js is provided in Appendix A.2.3. 7
Consumption step
Analogously to production sites, each consumption site js is equipped with an input storage for each good consumed in the corresponding region. Since goods are not substitutable, js has a desired (or targeted) consumptionC i→js for each of its input goods. We assume that the desired consumption of each input commodity i varies isoelastically with the corresponding consumer pricen in i→js (see Eq. (A.8) for details). Moreover, consumption may be directly affected by a disaster, expressed by an exogenous factor λ i→js ∈ [0, 1]. In total, the demand curve for a consumption site is given as
where ε c i→js ∈ [−1, 0[ denotes the consumption elasticity for commodity i. In the baseline state the price is unity, n * i→js = 1, and the consumption of each input commodity i equals the total input flow of this good, C * i→js ≡ r Z * ir→js . The consumption elasticity ε c i→js may differ among input goods; this permits to distinguish consumption from investments goods. Consumption goods are needed for immediate consumption and therefore have a lower consumption elasticity than investment goods. The purchase of investment goods can be delayed if prices are high in the disaster aftermath. Note that, in principle, more complex consumption behaviors could be considered, e. g., in order to account for increased governmental spending subsidizing the sectors most affected by the disaster. In the presence of supply disruptions, demand, and hence consumption of a good i, can be rationed due to supply shortage. Thus, actual consumption is given by the minimum of desired consumptionC i→js and possible useÛ i→js ),
Expectation step
In the second sub-step, the expectation step (green shading in Fig. 2 ), each production site js forms expectations on two of its variables for the next timestep: its upcoming production level E Xjs and the corresponding offer price En js , to which it aims to sell its product in average 5 . For that, it firstly determines 165 the productive capacity and the production costs it expects to have in the next timestep. Note that, since the former may be limited by the availability of input goods and the latter depend on the price of the input goods, this is only possible after the production site has received its suppliers' deliveries at the end of the production step. Further, we assume that production site have 'naive expectations' on their incoming demand in the next timestep; they assume that it will remain unchanged. However, a special case arises if the production 170 site has received a low-in-quantity but highly priced incoming demand in the current timestep. In this case to be addressed as low demand in the following, the production site reduces its offer price to attract more demand. Eventually, the production site communicates both, expected optimal production level and offer price, as guidance values to its purchasers. Details on the expectation step are given in Appendix A.3.
Purchasing step 175
Finally, in the third sub-step, the purchasing step (red shading in Fig. 2 ), each economic agent formulates new demand requests to be able to keep up production in the next timesteps. This is done by production sites and consumption sites alike. For the distribution of demand among its suppliers, each agent has to decide on the quantity it requests from each supplier as well as on the purchasing reservation price offered. This is done separately for each input good. The main ideas and equations are discussed in this section, 180 whereas details are given in Appendix A.4.
In line with the profit optimization in the production step, both, demanded quantities and purchasing prices, are determined simultaneously by maximizing the expected surplus for each input good separately. The expected surplus of js with regard to input good i is given by
expected additional costs for storage and transport (11c) Expected surplus is a function of the demand requests {D ir←js } r the agent addresses to its suppliers and on the demand it addresses to its storageD sto i←js . If goods are withdrawn from the input storage (D sto i←js ≥ 0), demand to suppliers decreases; if storages have to be replenished (D sto i←js < 0), demand to suppliers increases. Agent js's total demand for commodity i is then given by the sum of both contributions, 185D i←js ≡ rD ir←js +D sto i←js . From Eq. (11), we see that the expected surplus is given by the difference of 'expected gain-from-purchase' and expected purchasing costs 6 . The 'expected gain-from-purchase' in Eq. (11a) gives the value the agent expects to gain from using the purchase in a future time step. For that, it values the total quantity purchased for later use,D i←js , at a price given by the ratio of possible expenditure and current use,Ê i→js /U i→js . This gain is limited by the possible expenditureÊ i→js for the 190 input good under consideration, and its particular meaning depends on the type of economic agent. For a production site, the 'expected gain-from-purchase' is the revenue the production site expects to be able to generate from its purchases. As detailed in Appendix A.4.1, we assume that the budget it can spend on purchases, i. e., its total possible expenditure, is given by the difference of profit and labor costs in the current timestep. To obtain the possible expenditure for each input good, this budget is then distributed 195 among the input goods according to their shares in the production process. For a consumption site js, the 'expected gain-from-purchase' expresses the additional future consumption opportunities the agent expects to gain from the purchases. Since, it does not know to which prices it will be able to consume its input goods in the next timestep, it makes the assumption that these prices will remain at their current levels. In consequence, its possible expenditure for each input good i is simply given by its desired consumptionC i→js 200 of this good, i.e.Ê i→js =C i→js .
An agent js also has to account for expected costs for purchases, which is described by Eq. (11b). To estimate these, the agent needs to form expectations on the shapes of its suppliers' supply curves for the next timestep, {E js nir } r . On the one hand, this expectation is based on the deliveries js has received from its suppliers in the production step, as well as on the information on optimal production levels and offer prices 205 the suppliers have communicated in the expectation step. On the other hand, to form this expectation, js has to make assumptions on the demand requests of its purchasing competitors with respect to quantity and price. More details on the expected supply curves are given in Appendix A.4.2.
Additional costs arise for withdrawing from storage as described by the 2 nd term in Eq. (11b). These may be negative, permitting to increase the expected surplus by purchasing more from its suppliers for storage replenishment. This case arises if js expects to be able to purchase the commodity to a price lower than or equal to the unit costs for storage withdrawaln i→js . Since storage replenishment resembles an investment into js's commodity stock, we assume that js is then willing to spend an extra budget part ofn in i→js D sto i←js for this purpose.
Also, transport and storage holding come at costs given by Eq. (11c). These arise if demand requests or 215 storage content deviate from their values in the baseline state. In the following, they are also referred to as penalties. More details on how they are calculated can be found in Appendix A.4.3. Eventually, the optimal distribution of demand requests as well as the optimal demand to storage for the input good under consideration are obtained by maximizing the expected surplus. More precisely, the demand quantities are obtained from the constrained nonlinear optimization problem 7
For each demand request D ir←js , the corresponding optimal purchasing price is then given by
The boundary conditions in Eq. (12) imply that, on the one hand, each demand requestD ir←js that js addresses to one of its suppliers ir is positive and remains below the maximum value js expects ir to be able to deliver in the next timestep (see Eq. (A.47) for a definition). On the other hand, it implies that the 220 demand it addresses to its own input storage neither exceeds maximum storage capacity nor storage content (see Appendix A.4.4 for details).
Model performance in the disaster aftermath
In this section, we analyze the response of the model to production interruptions triggered by unexpected adverse events. To this end, we focus on the direct and indirect economic effects of stylized disasters. We 225 study scenarios that are not meant to be realistic but are chosen to illustrate the model performance -we do not aim at hindcasting or forecasting losses of real-world extreme events. The economic network used is based on the Eora-MRIO database (Lenzen et al., 2012) with 2009 as the base year. This permits to account for 27 different sectors including final demand (see Table B .3), and a regional resolution on the country level (see Table B .2). The economic agents correspond to the nodes in the network, which are connected by input and 230 output flows (measured in USD/year). Flows below a threshold value of 1 million USD/year are neglected to avoid numeric instabilities. If this results in agents without in-going connections, then these are removed from the network. Likewise production sites with negative value added (cf. Eq. (A.19)) are excluded 8 . After this cleanup, the network consists of 4, 836 production and 186 consumption sites (one for each country) connected by about 500, 000 inter-linkages. The transport times are derived from inter-capital distances: for short distances less than 3, 000 kilometers, road transport with an average speed of 35 km/h is considered, whereas for longer distances a transport by vessel at 20 km/h is assumed. We use the average transport velocities of the different means of transportation provided by the Sea Rates project (see www.searates.com). Parameter values used in the numerical simulations are given in Table B .1. Please note that the model is well suited to operate on more refined data depending on the kind of scenario that is to be analyzed 9 .
In this paper, we focus on scenarios in which the machinery (mach) sector of Japan (jpn) is hit by an unexpected disaster reducing its productive capacity. For our simulation, we choose a daily resolution to model the economic response at the same time scale as the disaster. Thereby, we model the impact of the disaster in a stylized way, which permits us to sketch a clear picture of the underlying dynamics and economic principles. For the duration of the disaster, the productive capacity of the sector is evenly reduced, 245 and, after the disaster, the full productive capacity is restored immediately. That is, no gradual increase of the productive capacity during the reconstruction phase is considered. Further, we assume that no other sectors are directly affected by the disaster. The machinery sector in Japan has been chosen, because it is a major sector in the Japanese economy. Therefore, a complete shutdown of this sector constitutes a non-marginal shock for the Japanese economy with global repercussions. As a consequence, demand surge, 250 i. e., the inflation of prices in the disaster aftermath, has to be taken into account (Hallegatte, 2014a) . This permits us to contrast our modeling approach to I-O models, where price effects are usually neglected. The highly industrialized Japanese economy is strongly inter-linked to other national economies rendering it a good paradigm to study the indirect effects of disasters on the global supply network. Furthermore, Japan is highly exposed to natural disasters as, for example, the East Japanese earthquake and the subsequent 255 Tsunami in 2011 (Kajitani and Tatano, 2014) or the Kobe earthquake in 1995 (Okuyama, 2014) . This renders supply interruptions by natural disaster more probable than in other developed economies.
Local production and price dynamics
In this section, we first concentrate on the local recovery dynamics of Japan's machinery sector (mach:jpn) in the disaster aftermath in Sec. 3.1.1. Then, we discuss how an economic agent that strongly depended 260 on mach:jpn's deliveries before the disaster redistributes its demand for machinery among its remaining suppliers in Sec. 3.1.2.
Local recovery dynamics of the sector directly hit by the disaster
We consider a scenario where an unanticipated disaster forces mach:jpn's production close-to zero 10 from day 1 to day 3 (blue shaded regions in Fig. 4 ), i. e., λ (t) mach:jpn = 0.001 for t ∈ [1, 3] (cf. Eq. (3)). The 265 recovery dynamics of key local variables in response to this close-to outage of mach:jpn is shown in Fig. 4 . Pre-disaster baseline values are depicted by horizontal gray dashed lines, and the beginnings of timesteps are denoted by vertical black dashed lines. Figure 4 (a) depicts the recovery dynamics of incoming demand, production (blue solid line), and expected production (red dash-dotted line), whereas Fig. 4 (b) depicts relative deviations of the corresponding prices from their common baseline value of unity. The timeseries 270 have been shifted to emphasize the timing of events within each timestep. At first (light shading), the sector receives its incoming demand D mach:jpn← (see Eq. (5)) from its purchasers. These have an average reservation price ofn p mach:jpn (see Eq. (8)). Incoming demand and average purchasing price are denoted by gray dashed lines in Fig. 4 (a) and (b). Then (medium dark shading), the sector determines its production by profit optimization according to Eq. (A.33) (production and average per unit selling price are depicted by blue 275 solid lines in Figs. 4(a) and (b)). Eventually (dark shading), the sector determines its expected production E Xmach:jpn (see Eq. (A.40a)) and its offer price En mach:jpn (see Eq. (A.34)), denoted by red dash-dotted lines in Figs. 4(a) and (b) and communicates them to its purchasers. mach:jpn = 0.001 for t ∈ [1, 3], others as in Table B .1.
The disaster starts at day 1. As the agents cannot predict the arrival of the disaster, incoming demand and average purchasers' price remain at their baseline levels for this timestep. Since the system was in 280 equilibrium before, all purchasers offer a price of unity, and the revenue curve is flat (cf. Eq. (A.14)). However, mach:jpn can fulfill only a small share of the incoming demand since its productive capacityX mach:jpn -and with it its actual production X mach:jpn -is strongly reduced by the external forcing (see Eqs.
(3) and (A.33)). To calculate its expected production E Xjs and offer price En mach:jpn , mach:jpn assumes that the incoming demand will remain unchanged in the next timestep (cf. assumption (ii) of Appendix A.3). Next, by taking 285 its reduced productive capacity into account, mach:jpn determines expected production and offer price by maximizing its expected profit (see Eq. (A.38) .
mach:jpn's purchasers in turn perceive a deficit in the transport chains connecting them with mach:jpn as the deliveries of mach:jpn are much smaller than in the baseline state (see Eq. (A.55)). Consequently, they try to compensate the shortfall of mach:jpn by bypassing their demand to other business partners.
290
This helps them to avoid storage penalties (see Eq. (A.53)) that would arise in case of storage replenishment (see Eq. (A.54)). In addition, mach:jpn's purchasers are confronted with transport penalties, because mach:jpn's deliveries are smaller than in the baseline state (cf. Eq. (A.52)). To reduce this penalty, they offer a higher reservation price to mach:jpn than in the baseline state aiming to increase their expected shares on mach:jpn's upcoming production (see Eq. (A.45)). This causes an increase of the average purchasers' 295 price from day 2 to day 4.
When mach:jpn determines its offer price at day 3, it expects the external forcing to remain constant and to still limit its production in the next timestep. However, at day 4, its productive capacity is restored instantly. In this timestep, mach:jpn is in the situation of 'low demand' as discussed in Appendix A.3.1: its purchasers are offer high reservation prices, but, at the same time, they demand considerably less from 300 mach:jpn than in the baseline state. Thus, mach:jpn can fulfill all incoming demand requests explaining the slight increase of X mach:jpn , and to attract more demand, mach:jpn reduces its offer price (see Eq. (A.36) .
At day 4, the mach:jpn's purchasers respond to mach:jpn's restored productive capacity. To refill their storages, they increase their demand requests above the baseline level. However, they remain with their expected demand shares, in average, below the shares expected to lead to production extension of mach:jpn
In consequence, at day 5, mach:jpn receives an incoming demand quantity above its baseline value but the average purchaser's price drops below its baseline level of unity. mach:jpn responds to the incoming demand by producing more than in the baseline state and by diminishing its profit margin below its initial value. This causes mach:jpn's average selling price to drop below its initial value of unity, too. Since, from day 5 on, mach:jpn receives sufficient demand, it now respects its baseline profit margin in the determination of its offer price. This offer price remains slightly below its baseline value, because, during the external forcing, mach:jpn had a reduced demand for its input goods due to its strongly limited production. In consequence, it was able to purchase these input goods cheaper than in the baseline state, which reduced 315 its production costs (cf. Eq. (A.31)). Therefore, mach:jpn can temporally sell its production at a more favorable price,n mach:jpn < 1 until, eventually, its production costs regain their baseline value.
Demand redistribution of a sector indirectly affected by the disaster
In this section, we discuss how a purchaser of the forced production site mach:jpn redistributes its demand requests to reduce the adverse consequences of mach:jpn's outage. We consider the same scenario 320 as in the previous section. Figure 5 (a) depicts the demand requests that the food sector in Japan (food:jpn) addresses to its four suppliers for machinery: the United States of America (usa, orange shading), Japan (jpn, blue shading), Czech Republic (cze, light gray shading), and China (chn, green shading). 11 In the baseline state, at day 0, mach:jpn is food:jpn's dominant supplier for machinery. However, in the presence of the disaster, food:jpn compensates the (close-to) outage of its main supplier by demanding larger quantities 325 from its remaining suppliers. Additionally, food:jpn withdraws from its input storage (dark gray shading in Fig. 5(a) ) at day 2. It determines the optimal way to distribute its demand requests by maximizing its expected surplus E SUmach→food:jpn according to Eq. (12). We see from Fig. 5 (a) that from day 2 to day 5, mach:jpn tries to refill its own storage in addition to demanding larger quantities from its remaining suppliers than in the baseline state. The success of mach:jpn's purchasing strategy can be deduced from Fig. 5 
depicting the deliveries of mach:jpn's suppliers as well as the change in food:jpn's storage content: the anomaly of that storage content is shown in Fig. 5(c) . Plotted are the contents of the first sections of the transport chains connecting food:jpn with its suppliers. For instance, at day 3, we see that food:jpn's strategy to request a much larger quantity (compared to baseline level) from mach:usa is not successful, because the corresponding delivery (orange shaded area at day 3 in Fig. 5(b) ) is close to zero. In contrast, mach:chn has the capacity and willingness to fulfill the enhanced demand of food:jpn (compare the green shaded area at day 2 in Fig. 5 (a) to that at day 3 in Fig. 5(b) ). However, since the transport time from chn to jpn is three days, the quantity demanded at day 2 and shipped at day 3 arrives not before day 6 resulting in a storage replenishment. It is worthy to note that food:jpn's storage level is neither reduced during the disaster nor in its aftermath. Since, in addition, food:jpn can keep up its production level (not shown), this 340 indicates that food:jpn's strategy for demand redistribution can effectively buffer the close-to outage of its main supplier.
At day 4, directly after the disaster, mach:jpn communicates to its purchasers that it has recovered from the disaster and that it has regained its full productive capacity. Together with an attractive offer price (not shown) this 'persuades' food:jpn to request nearly the same quantity from mach:jpn as in the baseline state 345 (blue shaded areas in Fig. 5 (a) at day 0 and day 4). However, since all of mach:jpn's purchasers respond in this way, mach:jpn cannot fulfill all demand requests. food:jpn is outbid by other purchasers of mach:jpn and receives nothing at day 5. In consequence, the deficit in the transport chain connecting mach:jpn and food:jpn remains unchanged. To compensate this deficit, food:jpn now demands from mach:jpn almost the same quantity as in the baseline state. In the subsequent timestep, at day 6, mach:jpn delivers 350 the quantity demanded, reducing the deficit in the transport chain to zero. In consequence, food:jpn can basically re-adopt its demand distribution of the baseline state. Also, it successively reduces its storage level to avoid a storage penalty (see Eq. (A.53)), by withdrawing from its input storage from day 14 to day 18. 
Global response dynamics
In this section, we study the impact that a local production reduction of Japan's machinery sector has on 355 the global economy. Figures 6(a), (b) and (c) depict production anomaly, storage anomaly and the anomaly of incoming demand for the forced regional sector (mach:jpn, blue solid line), the global machinery sector (gray dashed line), and the global economy (red dash-dotted line), respectively. Anomalies are measured as absolute deviations from the baseline values (horizontal gray dashed lines). The storage anomaly is given by the sum of the anomalies of all input storage levels. Figure 6 (d) depicts the corresponding relative deviations 360 of the average selling price of mach:jpn, the global machinery sector, and the global economy (averaged over all sectors). Again, the disaster strongly reduces mach:jpn's ability to produce on days 1 to 3 (blue shaded regions). Detail enlargements are depicted in Figs. 6(e)-(h) focusing on the timesteps, at which the disaster directly impacts on mach:jpn, as well as the first few days in the disaster aftermath. Here, subsequent timesteps are marked by alternating light and dark gray shadings. From the timeseries of the production anomalies in Fig. 6 (a) it can be seen that the forced regional sector mach:jpn recovers much faster than the global machinery sector and the global economy. The price effects decrease in magnitude from the forced regional sector, via the machinery sector hit by the disaster, to the global economy. This can be understood by analyzing the timeseries of the average selling prices in Figs. 6(d) and the corresponding detail enlargement in Fig. 6(h) . Locally, the outage of mach:jpn 370 is a strong perturbation for mach:jpn's direct purchasers; they have to readdress their demand to their remaining machinery suppliers, which in turn can be driven into production extension. The commodity machinery becomes scarcer, which results in an inflation of its price -demand surge occurs. However, for the global machinery sector, and especially for the global economy, the outage of mach:jpn is a rather small perturbation. This is why global price increases are smaller than local ones. More precisely, following 375 Eq. (12), the purchasers of machinery decide on their total demand and its distribution by maximizing their expected surplus. By doing so, they balance storage penalties (see Eq. (A.53)), which arise when their input storages are below their initial levels, with extra costs for the transport penalties (see Eq. (A.52)). The latter arise when the purchasers order more than in the baseline level to replenish their inventories for machinery. Therefore, the timescale of storage replenishment depends on the ratio of unit transport penalties 380 and unit storage penalties (cf. Eqs. (A.52) and (A.53)). With the parameters chosen for this study, the global machinery sector is driven only slightly into production extension by its purchasers, which subsequently replenish their machinery storages in the disaster aftermath until day 50.
Globally, the surge of the selling price is negligible (see red dash-dotted lines in Figs. 6(d) and (h)). This is in accordance with the observation that the global increase of production from day 15 to day 50 385 arises mainly due to the production extension of the machinery sector. This can be seen from Fig. 6 (a) by comparing the global production anomaly (red dash-dotted line) with the production anomaly of the global machinery sector (gray dashed line). On the one hand, the increase in incoming demand the global machinery sector is confronted with explains its increased average selling price from day 15 to day 50 (see gray dashed lines Fig. 6(d) ). On the other hand, it also explains why the storage anomaly for the global 390 machinery sector becomes negative in the disaster aftermath. Since it operates in production extension, the global machinery sector has an increased demand, which it immediately addresses to its purchasers. However, the demand is communicated instantaneously, whereas it takes some time until the purchasers' deliveries reach the production sites of the machinery sectors. Thus, the machinery production sites start withdrawing from their storages. In a cascading effect, this induces further storage replenishment upstream along the 395 supply chains. Hence, a global reduction in storage levels can be observed in the disaster aftermath (see red dash-dotted lines in Figs. 6(b) and (f)).
Concerning production anomalies, two noteworthy aspects are revealed by the detail enlargement in Fig. 6 (e). First, it can be seen that, during the disaster, the production anomaly of the global economy is larger than that of the forced sector. This implies that the production interruption of mach:jpn causes 400 further disturbances along the supply chains. Since the input inventories of the production sites would sustain the production level of the baseline state for 15 days, these additional production reductions cannot arise from shortages in input goods, i. e., supply shortages. In contrast, they are induced by a reduction of the demand mach:jpn addresses to its suppliers. As it can be seen from Figs. 6(b) and (f), the input storages of the forced sector fill up during the disaster: though the production site cannot operate, the input 405 quantities it has already ordered before the disaster are delivered successively. As a consequence, mach:jpn reduces its demand requests to avoid an overfilling of its input storages and to minimize the storage penalties. Thus, its suppliers produce less, and in consequence also have a reduced demand. This results in demand reductions propagating along the supply chains from purchaser to supplier. As mentioned in the introduction, this propagation of disturbances in the opposite direction of the economic flows is known as backward-ripple 410 effect (Hallegatte, 2008 (Hallegatte, , 2014b . Second, at day 3 and day 4, the production anomaly of the global machinery sector is smaller than the one of the forced sector. This shows that mach:jpn's purchasers readdress their demand requests effectively to the machinery sectors of regions not directly affected by the disaster. Those manufacturers then increase their production and thus contribute to the mitigation of the supply shortages. Here, prices play a vital role in transferring information about supply and demand shortages; taking price
Global impacts of local disasters
In this section, we focus on the global repercussions of a local, disaster-induced production reduction. At first, we discuss loss propagation in the global supply network in Sec. 4.1, before studying welfare effects in Sec. 4.2. As in Sec. 3, we choose a very stylized disaster affecting only one node in the network to illustrate 420 the model performance.
Propagation of direct and indirect losses
This section deals with the propagation of quantity and value losses. We discuss direct and indirect production losses as well as loss cascades. In the pre-disaster baseline state, quantity and value losses are identical due to price normalization (see Eq. (1)). However, in non-equilibrium situations arising in the presence of a disaster or in the disaster aftermath, offer prices may differ from their common baseline value of unity. In consequence, quantity losses may in general differ from values losses. Both types of losses are measured in units of USD/day. The direct daily losses are given by the production reductions of the directly affected production sites, {js} j,s , for the time span of the disaster impact, from day
Total daily losses are given by the deviation of global production,
and indirect daily losses are then calculated from the difference of total and direct losses,
Finally, cumulative losses are obtained by subsequently summing daily losses over time, i. e., cumulative direct L D,(t) , total L T, (t) , and indirect L I,(t) losses read
The corresponding direct and total daily value losses are obtained by substituting X ml and X in Eqs. (14) and (15) with their respective values v(X ml ) ≡n ml X m and v(X) ≡ j,sn js X js ; the pricen ml denotes production site ml's average selling price as in Eq. (7). The indirect value losses are then derived from the difference of total and direct value losses (cf. Eq. (16)), and cumulative value losses read
Loss cascades occur when direct production losses cannot be buffered by storages. A 1 st -order cascade of indirect losses arises when the direct purchasers of the shocked sector have to interrupt production because their input storages are depleted, and they consequently cannot buffer its outage any longer. More generally, 425 a loss cascade of n th -order arises when the forcing is long enough to deplete the input storages of production sites linked to the forced sector by n − 1 business partners. These loss cascades were discussed in detail in Bierkandt et al. (2014) describing the first version of the acclimate model, which did not take the demand side of the economy into account. For several reasons, the situation becomes more complex if the demand side is considered as discussed in detail in Wenz et al. (2014a) . First, in addition to supply shortages, demand shortages may occur leading to backward ripple effects as discussed in Sec. 3.2. Second, economic agents can readdress their demand to non-affected suppliers. Since, here, the unaffected suppliers have the ability to extend production -the economy has idle capacities -indirect losses can be mitigated effectively. This reduces the risk of supply chain interruptions and therefore increases the economy's resilience. Third, in this model version production sites can reduce or stop production when the average purchasers' price is too low 435 thereby enhancing indirect losses.
Timeseries of quantity and value losses are depicted in Fig. 7 . Again, the production of mach:jpn is forced close to zero (λ (t) mach:jpn = 0.001 for t ∈ [1, 21] ). Compared to the previous sections, a considerably longer disaster time (forcing length) of 21 days is chosen to observe more pronounced price effects. Particularly, the disaster is now sufficiently large to deplete the input storages of the economic agents since these last only for 440 15 days at baseline production level. As a consequence, loss cascades occur from day 16 onward (vertical black dashed lines in Fig. 6 ). Figure 7 (a) shows the temporal evolution of daily total losses (gray solid line and circles); direct and indirect losses are indicated by blue and red shadings, respectively; alternating light and dark shadings highlight subsequent timesteps (days). Indirect daily losses increase strongly during the first four days of the disaster, then they decrease and almost saturate. Due to the appearance of the first 445 loss cascades at day 16, indirect daily losses increase significantly in subsequent timesteps. The large peak of indirect losses at day 38 is due to an additional higher-order effect indicating that supply shortages cannot be buffered completely by the direct purchasers of the forced sector. Instead, they continue to propagate along the supply chains and peak at bottlenecks. In consequence, the shape of the loss peak strongly depends on the topology of the underlying trade network and the transport delays. As discussed in the previous 450 section, the global economy increases its production above its pre-disaster baseline level to replenish the input storages in the disaster aftermath. This is why indirect and total daily losses are negative from day 38 to day 40 and again from day 42 to day 128 (not shown). In summary, it is important to note from Fig. 7 (a) that the temporal evolution of indirect and therefore of total losses is strongly nonlinear. Thus, we may conclude that, for a precise loss assessment, it is advantageous to use a model describing the economic 455 impacts on the disaster's timescale.
For a better understanding of the relation between direct and indirect losses, Fig. 7 (b) shows indirect cumulative losses in terms of direct cumulative losses. Each data-point depicts direct versus indirect losses for a certain forcing length (see upper x-axis) 12 . Value and quantity losses are denoted by orange and blue dots, respectively. From day 16 onward (gray shaded region), the first loss cascades occur increasing the slopes 460 of the curves for cumulative quantity and value losses. We can derive three main messages from Fig. 7(b) . First, it reveals that, for non-marginal perturbations of the economy, indirect losses can be of the same order of magnitude as cumulative direct disaster losses, and should therefore be comprised in a comprehensive disaster assessment. Second, inventory holding has a mitigating effect on indirect losses; this is why in the gray shaded region, where storages are depleted, indirect losses are strongly enhanced. Third, it is important 465 to consider scarcity driven price inflation, which increases value losses (orange dots) compared to quantity losses (blue dots). This observation is in line with the findings of Hallegatte (2014a).
These three main messages are also underlined by Fig. 7(c) depicting the ratio of total to direct losses, which is plotted as a function of direct cumulative losses and forcing length. This ratio known as economic amplification ratio (EAR) was introduced by Hallegatte et al. (2007) representing the factor by which total losses outstrip direct ones. Thus, the EAR is a measure for the importance of indirect losses with respect to direct ones; an EAR significantly larger than unity indicates that direct losses are insufficient to estimate the overall consequences of a disaster (Hallegatte, 2008) . Here, the EAR is plotted for quantity as well as for value losses. It increases rapidly within the first four days of the disaster and then saturates at a value of about 1.15 for quantity losses and 1.3 for value losses before increasing again from day 16 onward -in 
Global consumption changes
In this section, we study the the global welfare effects of a local disaster induced production disruption.
More precisely, we discuss changes in (final) consumption at a regional level. These may be interpreted as a proxy for changes in purchasing power; thus, they are a measure for the consumers' welfare.
12 Note that since we always force the same sector to the same extent, disaster length is a proxy for disaster size. For this purpose, we define the total final consumption of a region s,
as the sum of the final consumption flows C (t) i →js (see Eq. (10)) of each good i consumed in s. Accordingly, region s's final consumption in the baseline state is given by C * js ≡ i C * i →js . Note, that the above definition implies that goods for final consumption are not interchangeable. Next, we may obtain the cumulative consumption changes induced by a production reduction between time t = t b and time t by summing up daily consumption changes,
As in the previous modeling exercises, we assume that all consumption elasticities are equal to −1. According to the definition of the desired consumption (see Eq. (9)), this implies that each consumption site js has a fixed budget of C * i→js for each input good i consumed in region s. From Eq. (9) and the definition of 485 C i→js in Eq. (10), we conclude that disaster-induced consumption changes in a region can have two reasons: one or several consumer prices may have changed in the disaster aftermath, or supply shortages limit the consumption of at least one good.
In the following, we discuss the channels through which an abrupt local production reduction can impact on the total final consumption. This includes the consequential impact on the welfare of the region hit by 490 the disaster as well as that of distant regions. In general, we can identify two main channels, which have counteracting effects on welfare: on the one hand, the final demand of the region under consideration may suffer from supply shortages due to the forced sectors' outages. As a result, producer prices rise and, in consequence, regional consumption is temporally reduced indicating local welfare losses. In the following, we denote this effect as the 'scarcity' channel. On the other hand, the outage of the forced sectors also implies a 495 reduced demand for their input goods. If the final demand of the region under consideration shares suppliers with the forced sectors, this can be advantageous since less competition implies decreasing consumer prices. In consequence, the local consumption increases temporally, i. e., local gains in welfare occur. This effect is denoted by 'reduced demand' channel in the following. Since a production reduction usually impacts on welfare through both counteracting channels, it depends upon the network topology and the disaster scenario 500 which effect dominates. Consumer prices decrease (i) if the final demand is well connected and can therefore easily replace the forced sectors by shifting demand to other suppliers, and (ii) if it, at the same time, shares many suppliers with the forced sector. If the opposite holds true, consumer prices increase. Further, it is worthy to note that the magnitude of the regional changes in total consumption depends on the final consumers' market basket, i. e., small welfare effects are observed if the consumption of a good represents only 505 a small share of the the region's total consumption. Figure 8 depicts consumption changes resulting from an abrupt regional production reduction of the Japanese machinery sector. For comparability, the same stylized scenario as in the previous sections was chosen -a close to outage of this sector for 20 days, from day 1 to 21 (blue shading). For selected economic regions (see Table B .2 for their definitions), the resulting daily and cumulative consumption changes are depicted in Figs. 8(a) and (b), respectively. In order to compare welfare 510 impacts in different economic regions, the consumption changes of each region are measured in terms of days of the region's baseline consumption. The forced sector is located in the Pacific OECD (pao) region. Within the first days of the disaster aftermath the 'reduced demand' channel dominates in that region, and total consumption increases. pao's total consumption performs a damped relaxation oscillation indicating the interplay of the two channels, before it eventually returns to its baseline value. At day 35, this rather smooth 515 oscillation is interrupted by the cascade effect that has already been discussed in Sec. 4.1 (cf. Fig. 7(a) ), which temporally renders the 'scarcity' channel dominant. The consumption of the economic regions that are only indirectly affected by the disaster respond with time delays. Together with the -in comparison to pao-smoother evolution of the consumption changes, this indicates that more intermediate production sites are involved and effects of different orders interact. Taking the European Union (eu28) as an example, Table B .2). Same parameters as in Fig. 7. time: in the direct disaster aftermath, the 'scarcity' effect is dominant driving up consumer prices, and therefore daily consumption changes are negative. Then, starting with timestep 150, 'demand reduction' dominates and consumer prices decrease, which results in positive daily consumption changes. In terms of cumulative consumption changes, the cpa(Centrally Planned Asia including China) region is affected most 525 strongly, which is probably due to the strong inter-linkages of the Japanese and the Chinese economies (for instance, many Japanese firms produce in China). Even one year after the disasters' strike, when cumulative consumption changes have already nearly saturated in the other regions, consumption losses continue to accumulate in cpa. Figure 9 depicts the cumulative consumption changes after one year, when the global economy has nearly 530 recovered from the Japanese production disruption. The color code denotes cumulative consumption changes on a national level, whereas bars denote cumulative consumption changes for different economic regions (see Table B .2 for their definitions). Positive and negative consumption changes are denoted by green and blue colors, respectively. Figure 9 reveals that, on a global level, the overall effect of the disaster is negative. However, cumulative consumption changes vary in magnitude and sign (i) between economic regions, and (ii) 535 intra-regionally between countries. For instance some of the countries belonging to Sub-Saharan Africa (afr) profit from the outage of the Japanese machinery sector, while others experience welfare losses. The region with the highest welfare losses is Centrally Planned Asia (cpa), probably due to the strong economic bonds between Japan and China discussed above. However, it reveals also the largest inter-regional differences; whereas China endures the strongest welfare losses, Mongolia profits from the strongest welfare increases in 540 comparison with the rest of the world. A detailed analysis of the disaster-induced welfare effects is beyond the scope of this paper. However, already from the very stylized scenario analyzed here, it becomes clear that welfare effects strongly depend upon the economic inter-linkages and the heterogeneity of sector sizes. Figure 9 : Cumulative consumption changes, one year after the disaster began, for countries (color-code) and regions (bars, see Table B .2). Same parameters as in Fig. 7 .
Discussion
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With the acclimate modeling framework, we aimed to tackle some of the limitations of other modeling approaches for assessment of indirect disaster effects. In particular we tried to find middle ground between I-O and CGE modeling frameworks with their often opposing assumptions and foci. In the following, we discuss our findings highlighting differences and similarities to these two model types.
Spatial and sectoral resolution. Being based on I-O tables, acclimate has been designed to account for a large 550 number of heterogeneous economic agents in order to reflect the economic inter-dependencies in high detail.
As in I-O and CGE models, its spatial and sectoral resolution is, in principle, only limited by data availability. Modeling the interplay of multiple heterogeneous agents and considering the network structure of their interlinkages allows to describe complex effects such as cascading losses and lock-in situations (Acemoglu et al., 2012 (Acemoglu et al., , 2015 . For instance, for networks of firms interlinked by trade-credit relations, it has been shown 555 that accounting for the agents' heterogeneity and the network structure permits to reproduce the main stylized facts of industrial demography such as output, growth, and bankruptcy (Battiston et al., 2007; Delli Gatti et al., 2009) .
Often in I-O and CGE models only the local economy of the affected region is modeled in detail. Since the supply chain network is globally integrated (Lenzen et al., 2013) , this limits their potential to describe 560 the impacts local disasters have on the global economy. For example, the global perspective adopted in this study reveals that welfare effects of local disasters are not limited to the economic region that was directly affected but have a global repercussions (cf. Figs. 8 and 9 ).
Flexibility of the economic system. The amount of indirect losses observed in a model is governed by the flexibility of its production system. Whereas the production system in I-O models is fixed rendering short-term 565 adaptation impossible (Albala-Bertrand, 2013), it is highly adaptive and flexible in CGE models due to price responsiveness and a high degree of substitutability among goods. Thereby, CGEs are calibrated such that supply and demand elasticities as well as the elasticities of substitution are suitable to describe an economy in long-term equilibrium. Both approaches may not be ideal to realistically describe the economic responses in the period of days to months following a disaster (Hallegatte, 2008) . This is why acclimate 570 aims to find a reasonable balance between them. We decided to incorporate microfoundations for agents' behavior. In that, agents have the possibility to respond to their current situation, up-stream by demand re-distribution (cf. Fig. 5 ), and down-stream by adaptation of their production levels (cf. Figs. 6(a) and (e)).
At the same time, substitution of inputs as in CGE models is not possible because of acclimate's Leontief type production system. The practical importance of these adaptation mechanisms has been highlighted in a study of van der Veen and Logtmeijer (2005) revealing that an economy's vulnerability with respect to supply interruptions is strongly reduced when demand re-addressing is possible and idle capacities are present. Further, in acclimate, supply disruptions are mitigated by the economic agents' input inventories acting as buffer stocks. As discussed in Sec. 3.2, price inflation in the disaster aftermath activates prior idle production capacities in the economic system enabling the agents to restock their inventories. In how far warehousing 580 improves resilience of the global economy to local production disruptions was revealed by our analysis of the economic amplification ratio in Sec. 4.1. We found that the baseline inventory level determines the disaster size that can be absorbed by the economic system. If this threshold is exceeded, indirect losses attain the same order of magnitude as direct losses. These findings are in line with earlier studies by Hallegatte (2014b) and MacKenzie et al. (2012) indicating that the interplay of both, inventories and idle capacities, constitutes a powerful strategy for disaster impact mitigation. However, since stock-holding is costly, the chosen inventory level is always a trade-off between economic robustness against production interruptions and efficiency in normal times (Henriet et al., 2012) .
Summing up, the production system in acclimate is less rigid than the one of I-O models, but it remains, at the same time, less flexible than the one of CGE models. Our modeling approach is therefore suited best 590 for the timescale of months following a disaster -too short for the economic system to restructure and to substitute scarce commodities but long enough to adjust its productive capacities.
Temporal resolution. I-O and CGE modeling frameworks either statically compare pre-and post-disaster states of the economy or, in the case of dynamic CGEs, have a coarse temporal resolution of 5 to 10 years (Okuyama, 2007) . In consequence, scarcity situations arising from supply chain disruptions in the immediate 595 disaster aftermath cannot be temporally resolved rendering a comprehensive loss assessment difficult. This is why, in acclimate, we opted for a high temporal resolution to study the disaster impacts on the same time scale as the shock occurs, which is in the order of days to months. This permitted us to resolve the cascading of indirect losses and to dynamically detect bottlenecks of the supply network that are responsible for large indirect losses (cf. Fig. 7 ).
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Since real world economic actors have to cope with uncertainties on future events (Babiker et al., 2009), the myopic agents in acclimate provide a more realistic setting for disaster impact analysis than dynamic CGEs with inter-temporal optimization assuming perfect foresight of all economic actors. However, the latter are more favorable to determine optimal policies in the long-run (Chen et al., 2016).
Price effects. In comparison to I-O models, CGE models have the advantage that they can account for price 605 affects. In addition, representation of prices opens up the possibility to base the agents' decision rationale on clear and simple optimization principles. Thus, in this version of acclimate, ad-hoc behavioral rules for the agents rendering their empirical validation difficult (Fagiolo et al., 2007 ) -a main point of criticism for agent-based approaches (see also Salle (2015) for a detailed discussion) -could be reduced to a minimum. In this study, we focused on two aspects of price dynamics. First, we showed that price inflation in the disaster 610 aftermath significantly enhances the overall costs of a disaster (cf. Fig. 7(b) and (c) ), and should therefore not be neglected in a comprehensive disaster impact assessment. Second, we discussed the welfare effects of local production disruptions, which are driven by changes in consumer prices (see Sec. 4.2). We found that the global welfare changes resulting from a local disaster are distributed very heterogeneously across regions (cf. Figs. 8 and 9 ), which is possibly attributable to the complex topology of the underlying trade network.
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There is one additional major difference between acclimate and CGE models worthy to discuss. Since the agents in acclimate optimize independently, there is no need to imply a market clearing equilibrium in each timestep as done in CGE approaches; in the short-term, disequilibrium situations with local supply-demand mismatches may arise (cf. Fig. 5 ). In disequilibrium, reservation prices of different purchasers of the same supplier may differ according to the scarcity each of the purchasers perceives. We find that these differences
Conclusions
In this paper we presented the model acclimate, which has been designed to assess the economic impacts of unanticipated production disruptions, caused, for instance, by extreme weather events. Since a comprehensive disaster analysis is out of the scope of this model description paper, we studied the impact of stylized disasters of different sizes affecting the Japanese machinery sector. In our analysis we adopted a global perspective and showed that, in the supply network, disruptions can spread from one sector to the next causing cascading indirect losses. Including price dynamics allowed to observe price effects, which further increase overall losses but can also lead to local beneficiaries. Over the last decades, firms have increasingly eliminated cost inefficiencies by reducing their warehousing and by striving for a smaller supplier base. Our 630 analyses suggest that these trends may have to be reversed in the future if meteorological extreme events are to intensify as projected in a warming world. We find warehousing to be a central adaptation option to reduce indirect losses; a higher redundancy in the supplier base may help to avoid supply shortages. However, more research is needed to provide a sound understanding of the global supply chains' vulnerability in order to enable individual firms to estimate their supply chain risk, and to provide guidelines for risk reduction.
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Our preliminary analysis suggests that it is crucial to not only focus on first-tier suppliers but to analyze the supply chain as a whole. Further, our analysis of local disasters' global welfare implications suggests that supply chain security is of high public relevance. Enhancing the resilience of the global supply network cannot be achieved by single countries but requires an international effort to facilitate the development and implementation of international standards, programs and guidelines to render supply chains climate-proof.
Transport stock. Transport of goods from producers to purchasers can be time consuming; the goods 'en route' form the transport stock. Let τ ir→js ≡ d ir→js ∆t denote the time needed for for the transport of commodity i from producer ir to purchaser js, where d ir→js ∈ N denotes the number of timesteps needed for the shipping. We conceptualize the commodities on the way as a transport chain with d ir→js transport sections 13 (see Fig. 1 ). Then, for d ∈ {0, . . . , d ir→js − 1} the amount of commodity i that is contained, at time t, in section d of the transport chain from ir to js is given by ∆tZ (t−d) ir→js . Adding together the goods in the transport boxes along the transport chain then yields the transport stock for this business connection, which may be written as
Further, the total transport stock of js for good i is then obtained by adding up the transport stocks of js's suppliers for commodity i, yielding T
Input storages. Besides the transport stock, the economic agents employ input storages for the commodities that they need for production or consumption to buffer supply failures. Let S 
In the baseline state, the input flow I * i→js of each good i equals its use in the production process U * i→js , i.e., we have
The storage content in the baseline state is assumed to be described in multiples Ψ i of the initial input flow
From Eq. (A.7), we note that since I * i→js = U * i→js hold true in the baseline state, the agents only have to 780 refer to their input storages if supply shortages occur in the aftermath of a disaster; the factor Ψ i describes the number of days that js can keep up its baseline production level if the supply with input commodity i is interrupted.
Further, initial storage content may be exceeded at most by a factor ω i . This implies that the maximum storage content may be written as
Additionally, we employ the factor µ (t) i→js ∈ [0, 1] describing the impact of a perturbation reducing the maximum storage capacity; in absence of any forcing, we have µ (t) i→js = µ * i→js = 1. The storage in total is then capped by the maximum capacity µ (t) i→js S max i→js of and its content at time t is given as
This permits us to calculate the costs to which js can use input good i. These are given by the weighted average of the unit costs of products arriving in the current timestep, v(I
i→js , and 14 the unit costs of goods stored in the input storage at the beginning of the timestep, V (S
i→js . Thus, these unit costs are given byn
i→js ) denotes the value of the storage before the production step of the current timestep (see rightmost arrow labeled storage content in Fig. 2) . Equation (A.8) has two important implications: firstly, since v(I (t) i→js ) as well as V (S (t−1) i→js ) depend on the purchasing price of commodity i in the last timestep, the input storage acts also as a buffer for the unit costsn in,(t) i→js . Even if js has to pay a high price for the purchase of commodity i in one timestep, unit costsn in,(t) i→js will, in general, not increase abruptly. Secondly, unit costs n in,(t) i→js are calculated only on the basis of commodities that are actually available for production site js, and commodities that are still in the transport chain are not considered. Further, it is worthy to note that, in the baseline state,n in, * i→js = 1 ∀ i, j, s holds true. The value of use U (t) i→js is then given by
We can rewrite Eq. (A.7) as
where r (t) i→js ∈ [0, 1] describes the share of the last input flow I
i→js that could be stored given storage limitations, i. e., .10) 14 Note that v(·) and V (·) denote the values of flows and stocks, respectively.
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Then, the value V (S (t) i→js ) of storage content S (t) i→js at time (t) can be calculated recursively as 15
where we have employed that in the baseline state V (S * i→js ) = S * i→js ∀i, j, s. Finally, the possible use of commodity i in the current timestep may be obtained from I This section provides details of the production step (blue shaded area in the flow diagram of Fig. 2) . At first, we discuss how a production site js calculates its revenue curve R js and its cost curve C js , which is done in Sects. Appendix A.2.1 and Appendix A.2.2, respectively, before deriving an analytic formula for js's profit optimizing production level X js (see Eq. (6) The revenue curve of a production site js is constructed from the demand requests {(D js←k u , n js←k u )} k ,u it has received from its purchasers {k u } k ,u at the beginning of the production sub-step (cf. Fig. 2 ). Away from equilibrium, different purchasers of js have, in general, offered different purchasing prices. For bookkeeping purposes, it is thus useful to arrange the demand requests in an ordered set J js ≡ ({ku} k,u , >) , (A.13) where relation > orders the demand requests {(D js←ku , n js←ku )} ku with respect to their purchasing prices, i. e., (ku) 1 > (ku) 2 means that n js←(ku)1 > n js←(ku)2 . Then, js's revenue curve may be expressed as
Here, the index
denotes the largest element of the ordered set J js for which the accumulated demand of the elements b ≤ l max is smaller than or equal to a given production levelX js .
for simplicity (however, the model could easily be extended to take them into account.) Further, we assume that both, C in js as well as C lab js , depend linearly upon production levelX js .
Input costs. At first, we discuss the input costs, which are calculated by summing up the values {v(Ȗ i→js )} i of the inputs {Ȗ i→js } i needed for the production ofX js and therefore read
In the second equality of the above equation, we have introduced the technology coefficient
It describes how many units of input good i, js needs to produce one unit of output j in the baseline state. Thus, the technology coefficients are a measure for the efficiency of a production site, which may be seen as follows: let us assume two production sites js and js both producing commodity j. Then, the production 800 site for which the sum of the technology coefficients assumes the smaller value is more efficient, because it can produce the same amount of j with less inputs. Since we are interested in the short term economic development in the first months following a disaster, no technological development is taken into account, and the technology coefficients are constant, i. e., we have a (t) i→js = a * i→js ∀t. Further, in the third equality of Eq. (A.16), we have introduced the input costs for one unit of js, which are given by sum of the average unit costs of the input goods weighted by the technology coefficients and therefore readn in js ≡ i n in i →js a * i →js , wheren in i→js denote the average unit costs for input commodity i (see Eq. (A.8) ). Since, in the baseline state, we haven in, * i→js = 1 ∀ i, the baseline input costs are simply given by the sum of the technology coefficients n in, * js ≡ i a * i →js ≤ 1.
Labor costs. The labor costs of a production site js are defined as C lab js (X js ) ≡ n lab jsXjs , (A.18) where n lab js denotes the unit labor costs. In contrast to the input costs in the baseline state, which can be directly determined from the initial flows comprised in the MIRO-tables, not all MIRO-tables provide labor costs. This is the reason why we determine the labor costs in terms of value added and unit profit margin in the baseline state. First, we calculate the value added in the baseline state from the MRIO-tables and then split it into baseline labor costs and baseline profit. By considering the latter as an exogenous parameter, the labor costs can be determined endogenously. More precisely, we define the value added of a production site js as the difference of revenue and input costs, which itself is the sum of labor costs and profit (for a production equal or less the baseline production):
= C lab js (X js ) + Π js (X js ). From Eqs. (A.14), (A.16), and (A.18) , we then see that the value added per unit produced may be written as VA js (X js ) X js =n js −n in js = n lab js + π js , (A.20)
where π js denotes the unit profit margin. In the baseline state, the average unit price is equal to unity (n * js = 1), and, thus, Eq. (A.20) simplifies to VA * js X * js = 1 −n in, * js = n lab, * js + π * js , (A.21)
where VA * js ≡ VA js (X * js ), n lab, * js ≥ 0, and π * js ≥ 0 denote the baseline values of value added, unit labor costs, and unit profit margin, respectively. Note, that since n lab, * js and π * js are non-negative, the RHS of the last equality in Eq. (A.21) is always positive. This implies that only production sites with positive initial value added are considered, and, for instance, heavily subsidized sectors with negative value added are removed from the network. However, in practice this constraint affects only very few production sites. Further, in this study, we assume for simplicity reasons that the unit labor costs do not change in the disaster aftermath. where π * js is set exogenously as discussed below, and VA * js /(X * js ) = 1 −n in, * js is obtained from the MRIO-data. However, in subsequent studies, these simplifying assumptions may be dropped in favor of data based labor costs. To calculate π * js , we introduce the initial profit margin π * j as an exogenous parameter that may differ among sectors. Depending on the value of π * j , this profit margin may not be achievable for all production sites of sector j, because for the less efficient ones the difference of initial product price,n * j = 1, and n in, * js may be smaller than π * j . Therefore, we see from Eq. (A.21) that π * js ≡ min π * j , 1 −n in, * js (A.23)
is a meaningful definition of the initial profit margin that guarantees π * js to be positive. Note that away from 805 the basic initial state, the profit realized, and, thus, the profit margin depend on the purchasing prices. In consequence, π js can differ from its baseline value π * js .
Penalty function. We assume that the slope of production site js's cost function C js (cf. Eqs. (A.15) ) increases strictly monotonically in production extension to guarantee increasing marginal costs reflecting js's additional expenses. In consequence, the penalty function P js has to be convex non-negative, continuously differentiable at least once, and zero below production extension. More precisely, we imply that the production extension penalty P js has to fulfill the following conditions:
P js ∈ C 1 ([0, λ js β j X * js ]), P js (X js ) ≥ 0 (A.24) P js (X js ) ≥ 0 forX js ∈ [0, λ js β j X * js ], P js (X js ) = P js (X js ) = 0 forX js ∈ [0, λ js X * js ], where (·) denotes the derivative with respect to production levelX js , and the set of continuously differentiable functions on P js 's range of definition [0, λ js β j X * js ] is denoted by C 1 ([0, λ js β j X * js ]). Further, we imply that the marginal cost curve C js (X js ) ≡ n c js + (P j • p js )(X js ) forX js ∈ ]0, λ js β j X * js ], (A.25) does not depend on the size of the production site but only depends upon the production ratio
which is the ratio of production levelX js and forced initial production λ js X * js . This is expressed in Eq. (A.25) by writing the marginal penalty function
as a concatenation (•) of a function P j = P j (p js ) that does only vary among sectors and is thus independent of the regional index s with the production ratio p js defined above. Assuming that in production extension, P js can be expressed as a 2 nd -order polynomial, we may write P js as
where A js , B js , C js and D js are constants, which are determined from conditions (A.24) and (A.27) in the following. Taking the derivative of Eq. (A.28) with respect toX js yields the marginal penalty function as
2A js (X js − B js ) + C js forX js ∈ ]λ js X * js , λ js β j X * js ], (A.29)
From the continuity of P js at λ js X * js , it follows from Eq. (A.28) that limX js λjsX * js P js (X js ) = 0 has to hold, which implies D js ≡ 0 and B js ≡ λ js X * js . Further, from the continuity of P js at this point, we gather from Eq. (A.29) that limX js λjsX * js P js (X js ) = 0 holds implying C js ≡ 0. Eventually, we see from 810 Eq. (A.29) that condition (A.27) is fulfilled by the choice A js ≡ n > j /(λ js X * js ), where the constant n > j that describes the price increase in production extension is given in units of initial price P * j , and may vary among sectors. Concluding, P js can be written as
forX js ∈ [0, λ js X * js ], n > j λ js X * js X js − λ js X * js 2 forX js ∈ ]λ js X * js , λ js β j X * js ].
(A.30)
The cost curve resulting from these assumptions is depicted by a blue solid line in Fig. 3(b) . Below production extension (X js ≤ λ js X * js ), it increases linearly with production levelX js , and its slope is given by the unit production costs n c js ≡n in js + n lab js .
(A.31) However, in production extension (X js ∈]λ js X * js , λ js β j X * js ]), the slope of the cost curve increases smoothly due to extra costs described by the penalty function P js . In consequence, the actual unit production costs
Appendix A.2.3. Analytic expression for profit maximizing production level
In this section, we derive an analytic expression for production site js's production level X js . According to Eq. (6) it is determined by profit maximization. At first, js determines its profit maximizing production level X opt js without taking its productive capacity into account. It follows from Eq. (6) that the first order condition for a production level to be profit maximizing is that marginal revenue equals marginal costs. Further, from the definitions of revenue curve R js in Eq. (A.14) and marginal cost curve C js in Eq. (A.25) , it follows directly that, below production extension (X js ≤ λ js X * js ), the profit maximizing production level is reached, when all purchasers of the ordered set J js (see Eq. (A.13) ) are served, which have offered (purchasing) prices above or at least equal to js's unit production costs n c js (see Eq. (A.31) ). In the following, this subset of J js is denoted by
In production extension (X js ∈ ]λ js X * js , λ js β js X * js ]), the penalty function P js (see Eq. (A.30)) renders the shape of the cost curve C js more complex. However, since C js remains concave (C js (X js ) ≥ 0) and R js is convex (R js (X js ) ≤ 0), we may still obtain X opt js by equating marginal revenue and marginal costs, which yields
where n opt js← denotes the price of the lowest priced purchaser that would obtain a non-zero share of X opt js . Summing up, the optimal production level is given by
for X opt js > λ js X * js .
(A.32)
To determine its actual production X js ≡ min X opt js ,X js , (A.33) js additionally has to take its productive capacity and its supply situation into account by capping X opt js with its productive capacityX js defined in Eq. (3) Appendix A.3. Details on expectation step 820 In the expectation step (green shaded area in the flow diagram of Fig. 2 ) each production site js determines the production level E Xjs it expects to be profit-optimizing in the next timestep as well as the corresponding (offer) price En js to which it expects to be willing to sell this production on average. At first, a js has to form expectations on its revenue and cost curves in the next timestep (see Appendix A.3.1). Then, js can determine the production level that it expects to be profit maximizing in the next timestep by maximizing 825 expected profit (see Appendix A.3.2). Appendix A.3.1. Expected revenue and cost curves Expected revenue curve. To derive its expected revenue curve, js has to make assumptions what exogenous forcing it will perceive and what incoming demand requests it will obtain in the next timestep. Here, it is assumed that (i) the exogenous forcing λ js and {µ i→js } i reducing js's production and storage capacities, respectively, remain at their current level, and that, (ii) in general, the structure of incoming demand requests will remain unchanged with respect to quantities and prices compared to the current timestep. However, it is assumed that a special case arises if js is facing a small but highly priced total incoming demand; more precisely, if js's total incoming demand 835 is smaller than in the (forced) baseline state (D js← < λ js X * js ) and all purchasing prices are higher than js's expected production costs (n js←ku > E n c js ∀k, u). In this case, addressed as 'low demand' in the following, js applies a special selling strategy to attract more demand.
Assumption (i) expresses that we consider the arrival and exact duration of extreme events to be unpredictable. Assumption (ii) accounts for the very limited network overview of the agents. They are unable to foresee demand shortages propagating along the supply chains that will affect them at some future point in time. To construct the revenue curve E Rjs production site js expects to have in the next timestep, it has to calculate the average price En js to which it expects to be able to sell its product in the next timestep. Analogously tō n js defined in Eq. (7), En js is given by the average price of js's expected production E Xjs and therefore reads
En
In the following, En js is simply referred to as offer price. We have to distinguish two cases: the general case and the special case of low demand. In the general case, E Rjs is simply identical to R js (cf. Eq. (A.14)) according to assumption (ii). If js would determine E Rjs in the same way when facing low demand, js would communicate a high offer price according to Eq. (A.34). This in turn would render js even less attractive for its purchasers. For that, when facing low demand, js is willing to reduce its offer price by isoelastically extrapolating the incoming demand requests above the level D js← (cf. Fig. 3(a) ). Note that this is a profitable selling strategy since it renders js more competitive, increases its incoming demand and therefore reduces the gap to the demand level in the baseline state, which is considered optimal 16 . In that special case, at first, production site js extrapolates its expected demand curve by an isoelastically shaped function, which reads 17
where n min js← is the reservation price of the lowest priced demand request that js received in this timestep; the demand elasticity ε d j ∈ ] − 1, 0[ is negative but larger than −1 and may differ among sectors. Then, the expected revenue curve, which, in the special case of low demand, is denoted by E R ld js , can be obtained by adding the integral of E n d js (EX js ) from D js← to EX js to the the revenue for the expected total incoming demand R js (D js← ), yielding
Note that taking the maximum condition in the above equation guarantees that E R ld js remains non-negative. Summing up, the expected revenue curve can be written as
. Expected cost curve. To obtain the cost curve E Cjs production site js expects to have in the next timestep, it firstly has to determine the unit costs E n c js it expects to have in the next timestep. This is done analogously 840 to the calculation of n c js in Eq. (A.31). Note that, nevertheless, E n c js can differ from n c js due to the input flows js received in the current timestep as well as changes in js's input storage levels. Eventually, E Cjs is obtained from Eq. (A.15b) by substituting E n c js for n c js .
Appendix A.3.2. Details on the maximization of expected profit
Analogously to profit Π js (see Eq. (4)), the expected profit of a production site js is defined as the difference of expected revenue and cost curves, reading
Before js can determine the production level E Xjs that it expects to choose in the next timestep, js first has to estimate its productive capacity EX js for the next timestep. For this, we firstly note that, at the end of the production step, js has received the input goods it can use for production in the next timestep. Knowing input flow and storage content, js can in consequence calculate the possible use EÛ i→js of each input good i that it expects to have in the next timestep. This is done analogously to the calculation of U i→js in Eq. (A.12). Next, the expected productive capacity EX js may be determined by evaluating whether EX js is limited by the input good with the lowest possible use or by the expected external forcing on the productive capacity (cf. Eq. (3) ). This permits us to express EX js as
Then, E Xjs may be determined, analogously to the current production level X js (see Eq. (6))), by a constrained maximization of expected profit, which reads In the optimization problem (A.40) it is implied that js's expected profit margin E Πjs /E Xjs has to be at least equal to its profit margin in the baseline state π * js (constraint Eq. (A.40b)), which is assumed to be the target profit margin. This additional constraint prevents js from communicating low offer prices, which would entail demand requests too low priced to permit js keeping up a margin of π * js . However, an exception is made in the case of low demand discussed above, in which this additional constraint is dropped in favor 850 of a more attractive offer price. Note that, in this case, the profit maximization (A.40a) has to be done numerically due to the more complex shape of E R ld js compared to R js (compare Eq. (A.37) to Eq. (A.14) ). 35
The offer price En js may then be calculated according to Eq. (A.34) . Eventually, each production site js communicates E Xjs and En js to its purchasers {ir} i,r . These parameters will enable js's purchasers to form expectations on the shape of js's supply curve in the next timestep as discussed in Appendix A.4.
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A special case arises, when js has not received any demand, i. e., D js← = 0. Then js cannot estimate an expected revenue curve. In consequence, js is not able to employ Eqs. (A.34) and (A.40a) to determine En js and E Xjs . In this case, we assume that js communicates its expected production costs as offer price (En js = E n c js ), and the minimum of possible and forced initial production as expected production level (E Xjs = min λ js X * js ,X js ). Note that this is a limiting case of js's selling strategy in case of low demand, 860 because the (forced) initial production level is considered optimal and the production costs are the lowest price, to which js will accept demand requests in the next timestep.
Appendix A.4. Details on purchasing step
This section provides details on the purchasing step (red shaded area in the flow diagram of Fig. 2 ). At first, the possible expenditure, i. e., the budget that an economic agent can spend on purchasing input goods 865 in this timestep, is discussed in Appendix A.4.1. Next, it is detailed in Appendix A.4.2 how the agents forms expectations on its suppliers' supply curves, before the extra costs for transportation and inventory holding arising in non-equilibrium situations during a disaster or in the disaster aftermath, i. e., the penalties, are discussed in Appendix A.4.3. Eventually, formulas for the maximum storage withdrawal (D sto,min i←js ≤ 0) and replenishment (D sto,max i←js ≥ 0) are derived in Appendix A.4.4.
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Appendix A.4.1. Possible expenditure
Since no growth dynamics is taken into account in this version of the model, js does not have the possibility to save for future purchases by spending less in the current timestep, i. e., no long-term investment or saving options are considered. Thus, possible expenditures are valid only for and only directly constrain decisions made in the current time step.
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Production sites. Here, we assume the possible expenditureÊ js of a production site js to be given by the fraction of js's revenue in the current timestep to be spent on purchases of input goods -the difference of revenue and labor costs. It therefore readŝ E js ≡ R js (X js ) − C lab js (X js ). (A.41)
After having determinedÊ js , js distributes its total possible expenditure among its input goods according to their shares a * i→js /( i a * i →js ) in the production process, where the {a * i→js } i denote the technology coefficients introduced in Eq. (A.17). This eventually yields the possible expenditure of each input good i aŝ
Consumption sites. Each consumption site js calculates its possible expendituresÊ i→js separately for each input good i. Its total possible expenditure for this timestepÊ js = i Ê i →js is then simply given by the sum of the individual contributions. As discussed in Sec. 2.1.2, each consumption site has a desired consumptionC i→js for each input good i. It varies with the purchasing price of the input good according to the inverse final demand curve given by Eq. (9). Consumption site js estimates its possible expenditure for each input commodity i by assuming that the current unit costsn in i→js (see Eq. (A.8)) for this commodity will remain unchanged in the next timestep. Thus, the possible expenditure for good i may be expressed aŝ in the production step as well as the expected upcoming production E Xir and the offer price En ir that ir has communicated in the expectation step (cf. Appendix A.3). However, js is lacking information on the demand requests of its purchasing competitors. For a sound estimation of those, js would need, for instance, information on the importance of the common supplier ir for each of js's competitors. This would require, on the one hand, that js has information on the rest of their business connections, i. e., on the network topology.
885
On the other hand, js would need information on its competitors' current market situations, e. g., if they suffer from other supply shortages. Unfortunately, due to its limited network oversight, js has too little information for such kinds of assessment. In consequence, js has to make educated guesses on its competitors' demand requests regarding quantities and prices. With respect to the quantities, js assumes that (i) its purchasing competitors keep their demand distributions fixed, i. e., from the common supplier ir 890 they demand the same share of its expected production in the next timestep E Xir as they expect to have received from its current production X ir .
Furthermore, js forms expectations on ir's production in the current timestep X ir , ir's production in the baseline state X * ir , ir's forcing level in the next timestep λ (t+1) ir , and sector i's production extension factor β i . These expectations are denoted by E js X (t) ir , E js X * ir , E js λir , and E js βi , respectively 18 . As shown below they permit js to form an expectation E js Xir = E js Xir (D ir←js ) on ir's production in the next timestep in terms of the demandD ir←js js addresses to ir. In addition, they enable js to obtain the minimum demand that would drive ir into production extension as well as the maximum demand it can expect to be fulfilled by ir. To keep the model simple, we assume that js's expectation on the above quantities are as good as possible, i. e., we assume that js knows X (t) ir , X * ir , and β i exactly:
Further, we assume that js has the same expectation on the forcing λ (t+1) ir its supplier ir will perceive in the next timestep as ir has itself. This can be written as
where, in the third equality, we have employed the assumption that ir expects the forcing to remain at its current level (see Appendix A.3).
18 Here, the notation E (·) (·) denotes the expectation that an agent -indicated by the upper index -makes in timestep (t) on the value of another agent's property in timestep (t + 1) -indicated by the lower index. For instance, E js n ir denotes the expectation that js has at time t on ir's supply curve in the next timestep (t + 1).
Next, we may conclude from assumption (i) that E js Xir can be written as
This can be seen as follows: the second term on the right-hand-side (RHS) of Eq. (A.44a) describes the share js's competitors have received from ir's current production. According to assumption (i), this is also the share js expects those to obtain from E Xir . In Eq. Similarly, by inserting E js Xir = λ ir X * ir into Eq. (A.44b), it follows directly that the minimum share that js expects to drive supplier ir into production extension, is given by
Next, we derive the supply curve E js nir that js expects ir to have in the next timestep. Since js has no information on the reservation prices of its purchasing competitors it has to make two additional assumptions. Firstly, js assumes that (ii) by bidding the offer price En ir communicated by supplier ir, it will receive the same share of ir's 900 production as in the current timestep.
Note that this is a meaningful strategy, since according to assumption (i) its purchasing competitors keep their shares fixed. If additionally they have the same strategy as js to determine their reservation price, they offer En ir , too, and js's demand request will be successfully fulfilled.
Secondly, js assumes that (iii) ir's supply curve for the next timestep is based on its production costs, which is a reasonable assumption if the market is competitive. This implies that if js aims to increase its share beyond s ir←js , supplier ir would have to extend its production. In consequence, js would have to compensate ir for potential additional expenses, as for instance, long hours of workers, etc. In reverse, for E js sir←js < E js s < ir←js , js expects that supplier ir will be willing to fulfill its demandD ir←js to a price lower than En ir .
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Note that this is in line with the production strategy for production sites (see Appendix A.2.3): facing a demand lower than its optimal production level λ ir X * ir , supplier ir will be willing to (partially) abandon its envisaged profit. Here, we assume that E js nir increases linearly starting from the unit production costs E js n c ir that js expects supplier ir to have in the next timestep, i. e., E js nir (0) ). If E js s ir←js equals the share s ir←js that js has obtained from ir's production in the current timestep, E js n ir equals the average price En ir that supplier ir expects to realize (in average) for its next production. E js s max ir←js denotes the maximum share that js expects to be able to demand from ir's next production, for shares larger than The resulting curve E js nir = E js nir (E js sir←js ) is depicted in Fig. A.10 . In production extension (E js sir←js > E js s < ir←js ), it has the same shape as supplier ir's cost curve (cf. Eq. (A.15b) ) with E js n < ir taking the role of n c ir . From Eqs. (A.15b) and (A.30) for cost curve and penalty function, we see that, to estimate the shape of ir's cost curve, js needs to form expectations on sector i's coefficient α i , sector i's price increase in production extension n > i , and ir's unit production costs below production extension in the next timestep n c,(t+1 The baseline state of the economy is assumed to be optimal with respect to its flows {Z * ir→js } i,r,j,s and storage levels {S * i→js } i,j,s . This is why the economic agents have to expect extra costs (i) for the transport of input goods if one or more demand requests deviate from the flows in the baseline state, and 920 (ii) for inventory holding if the storage content deviates from its baseline level.
In line with these assumptions, we may write the extra costs (or penalty) E C pen i→js that an economic agent js expects for the purchase of input good i as where E C pen i→js is a function of the demands {D ir ←js } r that js addresses to its suppliers {ir } r and the demandD sto i←js that js addresses to its own storage; ∆ TP ir→js and ∆ SP i→js denote transport and storage penalties, respectively, to be discussed in the following. Transport penalty. We assume that the transportation costs in the baseline state are negligible compared to the value of the transported goods. Extra costs arise only in non-equilibrium situations if agent js's demand requests fluctuate, and means of transportation, e. g., vessels or trucks, cannot be used to their capacity. A simple linear shape of the transport penalty is considered, which reads ∆ TP ir→js (D ir←js ) ≡ (A.52)
where ∆n tp,< i and ∆n tp,> i denote the additional unit costs for demand requests that are smaller (D ir←js < 925 Z * ir→js ) and larger (D ir←js > Z * ir→js ) than in the baseline state, respectively.
Storage penalty. We assume that the baseline storage levels are the optimal compromise between the high efficiency of lean production, where ideally costly warehousing would be avoided completely, and large buffer stocks, which help to mitigate even long supply disruptions. We assume that the costs for stock holding in the baseline state are already included in the production costs. Additional costs only arise if the storage levels of one or more input goods deviate from their baseline values. For each input good i of each agent js, we assume that the corresponding penalty function depends linearly on the storage shortage ∆S i→js :
where ∆n sto i denotes the additional unit costs that have to be considered if ∆S i→js is non-zero; these may differ among sectors i. Further, the storage shortage ∆S i→js depends upon the demand that js addresses to its own input storage for commodity i, which may be expressed as ∆S i→js (D sto i←js ) ≡D sto i←js + S * i→js − S i→js + T def i→js .
(A.54)
It measures the deviation of the new storage level from the baseline level S * i→js , after withdrawal of D sto i←js > 0 or deposition of D sto i←js < 0 to the storage. Note that ∆S i→js is zero in the baseline state, and negative and positive values of ∆S i→js indicate low and high storage levels, respectively. Moreover, Eq. (A.54) accounts for a deficit in the transport stock for commodity i, which reads
This deficit describes a deviation of the transport stock level T i→js that was introduced in Eq. (A.2) from its baseline value T * i→js , i. e., T def i→js approximates supply shortages or extra supplies currently in the transport chains connecting js with its suppliers of good i. Therefore, js has to consider T def i→js in its purchasing decisions.
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Necessary conditions for penalties. For the baseline state to be optimal under the purchase optimization Eq. (12) transport as well as storage penalties have to fulfill two conditions. On the one hand, agents should not resort to their storage when in the baseline state; on the other hand, they should not redistribute demand between suppliers in the baseline state just because they assume one is more efficient than the other. Reason for such imperfections are hidden costs in the baseline network used from MRIO tables. 935 
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To derive the condition for suppliers being perceived as optimal in the baseline state, let us pick, without loss of generality, two suppliers of js, ir 1 and ir 2 , between which demand is redistributed in the baseline state. Thus, D ir1←js = −D ir2←js . Then, for the left-hand derivative the following inequality must hold, 
